Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0a366e8339d15f28…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.2 KB Created: 2021-09-05 18:59:34 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: fb642d21b98a79753ecb6c4c823ac2d0 SHA-1: d11f13c22d678fc5d56ed2df813e3eb57ce274b4 SHA-256: 0a366e8339d15f2859cdc5a477a2fff93e6f1ea98bae51f3faa9a2487960475f
276 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and a machine learning classifier. It contains multiple links to potentially compromised WordPress sites and uses social engineering tactics, specifically a 'ClickFix' lure, to prompt the user to execute commands. The document body is heavily obfuscated, but the heuristics indicate a strong attempt to deceive the user into running arbitrary code.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.medicalalliedtraining.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d284a13458f---44261431214.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://al-bandak.com/userfiles/file/xazaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.kunapak.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/uqql5irik00rmrumi2q1gam1s6/32605602608.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sunarpazarlama.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7769tatvk5fic051lcm4pltfq4/jabovoxokodiz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://paymentsbusiness.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160f69f73bb60c---40012683929.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://autoandtruckrepair.net/nbloom/fckuploads/file/40303295238.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://adaviestransportltd.com/userfiles/file/97722190951.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.onlinetemsilci.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608205481cce1---sobotagob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kcpsystem.com/userData/board/file/6594204130.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lyzph.com/userfiles/file/Fl202108232026208111.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://upbilbao.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/mosikub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.saenger-ohg.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bf8415db7c8---devega.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://espressoperfetto.nl/app/webroot/files/userfiles/files/jafir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alemotta.com/resources/original/file/kopisumexupagilexuvi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fairytaleweddingsandeventsbymary.com/clients/f/f2/f272f95a0afb65faa7304057ec0e56f6/File/lewiperuvef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rockyshairsalon.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/sung9ce4l4jlmra0mns7l3r8sd/busupi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://antik-cafe-bergen.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a7f7afe39e4---lekaxezow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://estigotours.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/02e0c6627351313f5645f9f9412f78fe/65431654223.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zlhk.ru/upload_picture/file/35065160923.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://antitumor.org/filespath/files/20210811130342.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lcd96.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2b74db72801a07f89e52bd37631b3c41/25928478473.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://polipadel.com/userfiles/file/mijeraxelovor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://finestblogger.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/p9erflpbdutddfolsdas05f445/mutubipabibuduxul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hferrynetworks.com/FileData/ckfinder/files/20210623_74DC28E9C63ABDE0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/BkSY9tpko7c/uplcv?utm_term=brew+install+caskroom%2Fcask%2FwkhtmltopdfPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000df4b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDF4B 11148 bytes
SHA-256: 7fc96b1d0d5fb795f9c8352e99fabc07a5a4d2b22042fc0454b380aabba26878
font_01_sfnt_off0000f951.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF951 20096 bytes
SHA-256: 406d35d22778adfdfb76fe146c92b2a03c5936ae8f40c24997c4797a6d818bb1
font_02_sfnt_off00012f10.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12F10 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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