Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0a03bcf64cd81057…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

47.9 KB First seen: 2023-08-03
MD5: 37e5352615b74aa396a53f3eee8e8b6f SHA-1: 5a8ca76a49f35b88191d0d0f5af374d924e696a1 SHA-256: 0a03bcf64cd81057c2a0ac176fede840de936f83e073e6bf126f236a1d532fe1
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit technique. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'click Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass macro security settings and trigger the embedded exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003592.bin
ec9e7379b4e52e5e108c235d4910b281e3a7d5378f12557e08b4836f95e6a6ff
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3592 1584 bytes