Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 09b33553292dc273…

MALICIOUS

PDF

65.6 KB Created: 2020-11-23 15:31:52 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: f6b33fe4bc46d84efd52559c6e7b4636 SHA-1: 1c74be09acac57fecc80356fe95202e5c6a90bb1 SHA-256: 09b33553292dc2731eda729f8fbba2bf9d819e4b580549ad884d84f4c0fd08b5
304 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to known malicious redirector infrastructure or disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm or phishing campaign. The heuristic 'SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE' indicates the document may attempt to trick users into revealing sensitive information like recovery phrases or private keys. The presence of embedded URLs and the ML classifier's high confidence score further support the malicious nature of this document.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Recovery secret / private key request critical SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE
    Document requests recovery phrases, private keys, backup codes, or saved passwords. Requests for these secrets in a document are high-risk.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/aws?utm_term=skype+for+business+2015
    • https://dozisinabi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134646642/5521729.pdf
    • https://mizinunebij.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134660950/nakav.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4380237/normal_5f9d3b1580c3e.pdf
    • https://wefamojugibe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164519/ruripupelikad.pdf
    • https://vigofamuzozovi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134671609/9534080.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369901/normal_5fbb427ecfdfb.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369919/normal_5fa1c857dc44e.pdf
    • https://vurifupilubat.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134495287/gekeb.pdf
    • https://kulojimafad.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134518235/xilumufu.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d0644cfd-bd26-43dc-9349-d56cbae7e8ab/nikivuragu.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/89cb66f2-e281-41dd-8728-aaf115aaf5f7/mexorofulolekelidovuza.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mamukawaxatali/52562938952.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/febd0104-ea36-4ff2-8e19-edcd729ba5e7/76373263612.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c591.bin
cffe6731e673ea2001fb9ec358d2680972db76a42805cb94dc98907802991292		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC591 5512 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000d87b.bin
398fb4cd128ac82ee0751449ec9365916a53f3feef7c06c9f24acde92016f361		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD87B 9772 bytes

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