Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 09a4ca04fb2f805d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.8 KB Created: 2020-11-03 12:35:41 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-12-26
MD5: 0c5b627dc6aa42c57eb310b8fcad5aea SHA-1: 0dc5e68dce87d69eff62a8f04134c7311761a270 SHA-256: 09a4ca04fb2f805d9fb5b47b496e8a607195c5a781024cf983f7a3347813fb4b
194 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/aws?keyword=at+t+cleveland+white+pages+directory In PDF document text
    • https://netaluzubik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813777/werolajaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xutomanuvafara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134345830/tilobebarulakug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4427501/normal_5fa0ce939a784.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mevamakokuvafas.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134040887/topowekipufokulesob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sonefuvik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134325549/sepofujugafo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jizonuwuko.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814311/xapaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zozunane.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134316446/kewuxewumo_kifivulume.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://viweposedijul.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070314/84221afd4b04.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4375694/normal_5f9d01a97d1fa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vodoxuzet.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681632/vikegerafafevem_rozifi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dojarugakafep.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134471698/313310.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bufasadapigeze.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134307931/4466391.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00005b8b.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00005b8b.bin)
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/ganubifirigevi/mezowas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bededuxotulapil/vizio_blu_ray_player_firmware.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/woxojuxafopuv/55999290972.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/21d04aef-40e7-4478-9d6b-5e7715679a68/xutekebuxomekugawozo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/858cac34-c0b5-4868-845b-eda2f97bb52b/36511492285.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kugufitel/tekowadaketozarigajeleb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00005b8b.bin)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005b8b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5B8B 5580 bytes
SHA-256: 1344be749e41feafa2791d80bc1a292a2ba97e06a63341fdc3c724fe626cea8a
font_01_sfnt_off00006e99.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6E99 10352 bytes
SHA-256: 70c0a98cb5814b027dfbdd5023380b3a32a7858c5e462eebf74fdc8eab4195e1