Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 098c77726d20468b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

19.6 KB First seen: 2022-10-05
MD5: f73f9073fe08fc83944f4929225daeed SHA-1: 3c0e87e24b737f4bc4cb6350563accf270fdd73c SHA-256: 098c77726d20468b6ea75ad021742f9dd125fe2980f3099bc0736863f0a2fd37
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates an attempt to force OLE activation, a common technique for exploiting embedded objects. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a typical social engineering tactic to bypass security measures and facilitate the execution of malicious code.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000208c.bin
ced5655c0d95d3339471519459f661730b70d0154a7af0c1ec35200edba94149
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x208C 1819 bytes