Office (OLE) / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 098344c88f9c2bd3

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

105.5 KB Created: 2015-08-05 06:35:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word

MD5: d7cb467f635824318a01ca865bc2406a SHA-1: 591ec9fc1fa988ded78143257873109a040315c7 SHA-256: 098344c88f9c2bd31e80410456ee1805acc56b562c6593d4d16b642362bcf944

262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a Microsoft Office document containing heavily obfuscated VBA macros. Critical heuristics indicate that these macros download and execute a file from an HTTP URL. The presence of an 'autoopen' macro and the 'CreateObject' call strongly suggest an attempt to execute a malicious payload upon opening the document.

Heuristics 7

VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC

VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER

Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN

AutoOpen macro
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ

CreateObject call
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `ac4ab10ecab6a310870ec5951d607106a56db6b69b90b46a5aebcd4b5c9a9412`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	37309 bytes

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