Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0972332ca1ef9683…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.3 KB Created: 2021-06-30 01:45:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 422d6de00cbe56762c231abb71765dbd SHA-1: d465866d3a28b28784f8f9ed9ef808059baa1f4e SHA-256: 0972332ca1ef968303c37447f2c61a9113bbaabd53801dbee7ae3fd19635f747
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. The 'SE_CLICKFIX' heuristic suggests a social engineering attack where the user is prompted to execute a command, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The numerous embedded URLs, many pointing to compromised CMS uploads or disposable hosting, further support the malicious nature of this document, likely serving as a lure or part of a link farm.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9956

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://berallebags.com/UploadFiles/FCKeditor/20210625181820.pdf
    • https://greshamgilessalon.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3c1295f0f4b1c86b079a347de9b2c820/nuvadovulivoni.pdf
    • http://telmeed.com/web/ckfinder/userfiles/files/genesozazovuropaluj.pdf
    • https://akarchlight.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/987d31b0e95cdbfeffeea336eb08b406/68623169000.pdf
    • http://plenar.hr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160dab69a5ddfa---80977672016.pdf
    • http://fitnessklub-impuls.pl/uploads/assets/file/99969288548.pdf
    • https://otelnamore.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f87ba3d527d5faabef6abf399f6e3977/72488539902.pdf
    • https://www.ciabrini-immobilier.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8o5f0bcbq8n4ko0mqqiq6td9us/lowejidesewixilise.pdf
    • https://alignerco.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dd406f817395dec0af4051c81ad2d16f/wemol.pdf
    • https://protechlighting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/386fa69b3a165afbcb4875b04e702c13/kujafezetukivonivuv.pdf
    • http://lab4050.com/upload/editor/file/73031076215.pdf
    • http://axiomestates.com/userfiles/file/xomebojewoxipapupa.pdf
    • http://vasilii-orlov.fun/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ba5207d207cfe5550cf65fc7fe66aace/gulatisevaruwulabodero.pdf
    • https://szabobuszberles.hu/files/files/55168983586.pdf
    • http://stopasbestos.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607bb96ab8ac9---bujerotemajitono.pdf
    • https://evocative.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609edc49e5616---30080151952.pdf
    • https://mebelpozakazu.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/67d60f1cdee72187c9b4db0a008ed04b/47279088543.pdf
    • http://braciszewska-klimek.pl/fck_files/file/kifadexov.pdf
    • http://intechsol.kz/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c5548467643---98104516004.pdf
    • http://www.timtransportes.com/home/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b31d21daef4---47520453994.pdf
    • http://evabody.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16099c011045ac---sadaxuku.pdf
    • http://p-itos.net/admin/userfile/image/file/87990500246.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/S30rS-6n6vg/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+lock+changes+in+pdf
    • http://kioskcondoweb.wpengine.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16089ce5521070---manuvirezoxijadaketolef.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ea85.bin
996dd4eae2dfb69d7713d4dbda511c5d2c986cc90925d027c07cc75f8b9b8dbe		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEA85 17012 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000116be.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x116BE 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00012ed5.bin
e53a7e24db452e4d596dad597f4a528b4d27ae017b4837c52b94bbdf2af2ba44		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12ED5 10968 bytes

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