Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 094beb07be1d3d1e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

48.2 KB Created: 2020-07-22 13:45:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: ea59cf304be191147f71dad225b61fca SHA-1: 7a10b5cbc48cba86655d1b433d9c3c37d1ac0c15 SHA-256: 094beb07be1d3d1e4082b9d514ff9edecab9cdd40a29c8a10a6baa98f91358e0
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a link to a redirector URL, which is a common tactic for delivering malicious payloads. The heuristic 'PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK' and the presence of numerous external PDF links suggest a link farm designed to obscure the final destination. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text related to an Excel manual, likely a lure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=manual%20de%20formulas%20excel%202016%20pdf
    • http://files.access-genie.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740352/198dd1c4f.pdf
    • http://files.kahntilesupply.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302907/kafisiru.pdf
    • http://files.thelocalalameda.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398457/fakinoredo_fewiwagurat_gawodufi.pdf
    • http://files.itistheend.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452950/dikuvefuburexifizupo.pdf
    • http://files.athywaterways.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131858044/3c28b.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/5131/0488/files/6280387977.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/fovurasavelibegesixaga.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0471/4404/files/87344734834.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/8765/8141/files/mizakopeture.pdf
    • https://turuvonuza.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/keluxavopexis.pdf
    • https://dopotoma348431311.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/27656104021.pdf
    • https://zuketuvilo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/dikagezediwopeditisovo.pdf
    • https://duxugol.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/ketevej.pdf
    • https://fudinusaxuli.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/movoguwefutoxuzejaduxe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6200/9755/files/17317112281.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3785/9741/files/88685681561.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/6154/2054/files/kobexijovisamalivesuso.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/1588/9305/files/17784755495.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/2017/9864/files/noxuposizepa.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8323/5489/files/labawazomuvamitowejenaki.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7849/2072/files/zevogokowubu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7482/2043/files/5173825114.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/5354/7677/files/fazunejugunaropizetesetu.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000078f9.bin
ccb1c2379663ce7baee4e01a8790e05a36cc3e7e12529ccd6b5d295ab760ec10		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x78F9 5608 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00008bf9.bin
b427a8860bcf41c973ae76a81d807c004595ad3c91127a50d8c71818ba65311f		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8BF9 11564 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.