Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0939c2079a4e68e0…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.2 KB
MD5: 114a8102475cfda7197fe15fce2d4abd SHA-1: e5e79ae01135c2307d5cf0678d4f30410ccdf744 SHA-256: 0939c2079a4e68e0fc9239bfa7e20f3ab69fb19984ed240009f4f3e001d7df2b
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically targets the Equation Editor, a known vector for exploiting vulnerabilities. The presence of ".objupdate" indicates an attempt to force OLE object activation, leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common method for delivering malicious payloads via email attachments.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000be.bin
48b1c0a008895f4e9066b7ddc2f26fa3d05a61bf7fd08ec9c09a616f01da19ca
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBE 1458 bytes