Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 091e7d3539fbb1cf…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

152.4 KB Created: 2020-09-14 20:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 89ac3188e56234a1d9bc086b6a1daed2 SHA-1: bf350f24b01e9aeb1d40152aee49324c1c315d46 SHA-256: 091e7d3539fbb1cfb971b96abeeeb3b0e2abbaa3f19bbcf605f36589b2f7fadf
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a critical heuristic firing for an obfuscated PowerShell stager within a UserForm, along with high-confidence firings for VBA macros, a Document_Open auto-execution macro, and a CreateObject call. The ClamAV detection explicitly names Emotet. The VBA macro appears to be constructing and executing a PowerShell command, likely to download and run a secondary payload.

Heuristics 7

  • Hidden UserForm PowerShell EncodedCommand stager critical OLE_USERFORM_OBFUSCATED_POWERSHELL
    OLE document contains a UTF-16LE form/property string with an obfuscated PowerShell -EncodedCommand payload. The observed macro family reconstructs this hidden string with Split/Join or UserForm property reads and launches it through WMI/COM process creation. This is downloader malware, not an Office CVE exploit.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Emotet-9762672-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Emotet-9762672-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
c7305ccc26d392bb87c692b42d2d6bc38b982a0e4da883514cef9164df30503f
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 18576 bytes