Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 091a7e6045294f77…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.6 KB Created: 2021-07-03 21:31:08 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: d7953c34c3c3c17ce480e5f2550f0591 SHA-1: 33cf426f9b67c4492d10a851199625d06e424b23 SHA-256: 091a7e6045294f77659c3e7bedd35b2e659c05aa55e2e3b3e020b0311a8b2c9a
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of links, many pointing to compromised WordPress upload directories, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, supporting the assessment of a malicious intent. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was unreadable, so the primary attack vector appears to be the embedded URLs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9972

Heuristics 5

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://lightupalife.org.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ab750694259---xexivexorozulisi.pdf
    • https://www.limratechnologies.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c08a1733833---81810185233.pdf
    • http://sahrugs.com/userfiles/file/22216440973.pdf
    • https://www.andrecampbell.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bcdde4a188ba2a6c9d2212c1f1ceee2b/98480750959.pdf
    • http://careerhack.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a846bf57636---98505691934.pdf
    • https://hotelristorantenovecento.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/02ec0c53d75538bfc964a7a7aa2170b1/kinoboxanexenerogesolim.pdf
    • https://www.skyline-recruiting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/19eddf683c4e06a2a9bf819efe707e8e/neribagajixupewaduvab.pdf
    • http://lussoleathertiles.com/test4/EDITOR/example/v2/userfiles/file/lavojebatikase.pdf
    • http://chocolatycakes.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a59994e73d2---vakepefadadexa.pdf
    • http://www.telsercom.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608506cbcfbf9---lesul.pdf
    • http://drivescuolaguida.it/userfiles/files/sisukotaweleralibalopeva.pdf
    • http://visualpaint.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f8a43a8df7---69308467056.pdf
    • http://briarcliff70.com/clients/874901/File/tetunodigelagida.pdf
    • http://eske.hu/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b62721b6da2---12197945782.pdf
    • http://velo.hu/UserFiles//file/gexiluxuduruxoguvipi.pdf
    • http://lohsclassof70.com/clients/3/31/31ca850ff086a58b81c8700e10a01852/File/28911607519.pdf
    • http://bhttourist.com/upload/fckimagesfile/kugutuvazizewesitisubif.pdf
    • http://lab4050.com/upload/editor/file/takakigoziriwuvetavevode.pdf
    • http://lideparts.com/userfiles/file/1625183739.pdf
    • https://www.mybizwebsites.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a8a21c23e0d---nasugemobewudazexavudon.pdf
    • https://nscs.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dd233063f35971f5cfa8b45fdb801dba/mizagezawiwozo.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/A3Ryygt5BCM/uplcv?utm_term=most+powerful+scp
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000de34.bin
1c7fb29a1222805f24e9ffa1b29e32d33c6baef56e701f5f346d9d65135c9ca2
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDE34 10296 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f5ae.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF5AE 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00010dc0.bin
7632e8cfd22aad531ca8507de314e7f98a89793207b79ce2ff390a0e5e989b2e
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10DC0 16752 bytes