Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0912c7a2b48d9252…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.8 KB
MD5: 1098466d6ad9ac9b7bf4e86ce77524e4 SHA-1: 796e929f3c55329fb4b7bbb36e9f53d5e580f8d8 SHA-256: 0912c7a2b48d925240949186add277cf7454e2882977b85b6995981b37d46acf
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor and CVE-2017-11882. The presence of \objupdate and \objautlink further indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability for arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000ab.bin
ee98c15791d1318b33c19194fdaad90dfd27e382cec8a0c2a0fa2cfda978fded		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAB 1740 bytes

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