Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 090fba5cd807ac85…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.7 KB Created: 2021-06-26 11:25:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: de9027b976f817fcaccd366ac1957075 SHA-1: 4d207af4ed4f1cb5b7b9ce002c34afbb960875ba SHA-256: 090fba5cd807ac85bd47321feea9e6b202e41565a713954ea7a7e334d9a290d5
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF was flagged by ML and ClamAV as malicious, with heuristics indicating it's a link farm and a social engineering lure. Specifically, the 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' and 'SE_CLICKFIX' firings suggest the document instructs the user to execute commands via copy-pasting into a terminal, a common tactic for downloading and running secondary payloads. The embedded URLs point to compromised WordPress sites, further supporting the malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9956

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://math-talk.kr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/q2so2tkk7pgg66nlc18ajo7qlk/73468805667.pdf
    • https://adiwirawanbali.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3329c4cea5f7d0c70eafc8b256d27aec/nuleturug.pdf
    • https://www.alongsideasia.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f299652c7b2b74c03b815ac290eac08d/jikivobi.pdf
    • http://juniorsmagazine.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160901a5ea9178---najawifikisuted.pdf
    • https://webmodels.studio/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b28e51d2a6f---2095609597.pdf
    • https://landbondcorten.com/attachment/file/e8dd391616bf7ebfb342cc80964ca2cb.pdf
    • https://stcatherine.ac.ug/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608e9066600cb---47661197321.pdf
    • http://adabaskimerkezi.com/upload/file/fupinanenivozolizosix.pdf
    • http://hanhthien.net/uploads/file/74678274407.pdf
    • http://szyldkj.com/luodan/images/userfiles/file/bemapevep.pdf
    • https://sitebyside.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8bad1bb6d933a09a4d8a8cd4828a45c3/75116355784.pdf
    • https://postscriptproductions.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c02ab85b8a1---durok.pdf
    • http://trackeg.com/en/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608064bad18cd---33210194219.pdf
    • https://namastehealth.in/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/v3r65fikabl18pg0al8fagb770/zepuditavaribujip.pdf
    • http://kennyre.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16082160dc0161---xogaruxerirekawabemo.pdf
    • https://ngoctraithaibinhduong.com/uploads/news_file/bevigo.pdf
    • http://www.ncstarim.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8cobfon73negirgnb2e65c3de0/1003944348.pdf
    • http://www.maoles.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607e45e6dfd93---jujezigaxo.pdf
    • https://kham.vn/userfiles/file/56144945932.pdf
    • http://www.idenet.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609424d626715---ruwofukunofofikamolexe.pdf
    • https://beachesbrewing.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/af7d1f72cfb9ea1c40ed2c7106b1c746/ruduvafonupofevoviz.pdf
    • https://adasms.fr/userfiles/file/55974036861.pdf
    • https://www.americansummercamps.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16072679ae89cd---43451375286.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/3vuEKuznOb8/uplcv?utm_term=activate+windows+10+using+command+prompt
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e7e6.bin
78fe540f94b39fff802bb0433cad0dc13cc5f3bb14a98cbb48e9b8715f2b565f
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE7E6 11216 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001021b.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1021B 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00011a2d.bin
b3d06b92a1aec43b60d10c72a8929638e9a7db6477bf30a017d8ee6ec9f6c041
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11A2D 18016 bytes