Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 08fa0f706fc396cd…

MALICIOUS

RTF

10.1 KB
MD5: 0852c0e2255aae1522e6aabba53a5702 SHA-1: f631534b88570c8e5938132587953daf0b57c127 SHA-256: 08fa0f706fc396cd5015d07862705016732e3d6e6f3e3178c165a1cd94e1d0a1
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that leverages a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics indicates that the document is designed to trigger the exploitation of this vulnerability, likely leading to the execution of a second-stage payload. The specific exploit used is identified as related to the Equation Editor.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000010fb.bin
90e3bec20ce7f1642603625ee33346f39a219a3aee92deb9926a954d102643a6
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x10FB 1851 bytes