Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 08ed1fcf353a53c8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

69.5 KB Created: 2021-09-13 11:25:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: e0548787bf9fc0acd10b2c9b566e6752 SHA-1: 0586f51a346582548d51c8eceb6f529f55f34a3a SHA-256: 08ed1fcf353a53c804b4fcbe8f5d52716632478b1f1760208c773fb1e45710a4
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The 'document_open' macro is configured to execute a command. Specifically, it attempts to open a file named 'currCurrPl.hta' using 'explorer.exe'. This indicates the document is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload, likely initiated by a user enabling macros.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10009252-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10009252-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
1b16c734acd2fd193581ca6d1bfa40dc61b3377f6bdfb17f9472b2dd28ff01e6
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 685 bytes