Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 08e2d4a3b181a000…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

15.5 KB
MD5: 557e873de26a48ffe170f15fc433ec1a SHA-1: 4227df5a231f5161e663c49dddbe2ce191dc77c9 SHA-256: 08e2d4a3b181a00037de89345ab426106594b73cf31a32057638432494786559
240 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate a critical vulnerability, CVE-2017-11882, related to the Equation Editor component, which is known to allow for arbitrary code execution. This exploit is often used as a dropper for further malicious stages. The ClamAV detection name further confirms the nature of the exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • ClamAV: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6584355-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6584355-1
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001ab8.bin
9c944e6a036be72e82fc7593abf812ee6a4e7cc5d8fdb55110bb4424560e6938
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1AB8 4191 bytes