Emotet — Office (OOXML) / .XLSX malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 08dd3f0b83b04dcb…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

115.1 KB Created: 2015-06-05 18:17:20 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 12.0000
MD5: 03d8812d0a1d745780dd9759ae0f9c72 SHA-1: ed67d2a7c058dadd19bd2acc2d6ce1df6222e920 SHA-256: 08dd3f0b83b04dcbf83f28ccf6848a4a8efef3a9d78fb2b1d989901b74654196
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a Workbook_Open VBA macro that uses CreateObject to execute a batch file and a VBScript. The script itself is heavily obfuscated but appears to download and execute a second-stage payload from multiple URLs. The ClamAV signature also indicates this is an Emotet variant.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.EmotetExcel02223-9938902-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.EmotetExcel02223-9938902-0
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
df1eb14c222394595c0518b49eec2b55ed9573146c5f1717dedceddd2e199a2b
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 12041 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
3822fe4301e50731fe1c65063e26ccb68c467d4dbb79f39b7fac11b8bb698b55
vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 42496 bytes