Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 08d1e77b64497155…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.0 KB Created: 2021-09-10 22:53:44 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: 2b69b29d52e1bc2e6e3b1bf5db971b68 SHA-1: 501280132e2e70aa0a1d7c7eb42b578c8c438245 SHA-256: 08d1e77b644971554f140a633453ed6afe5d2d75c7f76c1ed768a9e983934566
252 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and multiple links to external resources, some of which are hosted on compromised CMS uploads or disposable domains, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The presence of a 'download button' lure and a 'browser update installation' lure strongly indicates a social engineering tactic to prompt the user to download a malicious payload. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection further support the malicious nature of this file.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9968

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://indagosrl.it/userfiles/files/nepureponutagugojipifope.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://graylegalservices.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/jamebemozoxemadixesamunud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://puzynowska-kancelaria.com/userfiles/file/20091180430.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://virtualpulse.eu/UserFiles/file/92980605651.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://anhbanglaw.com/userfiles/file/xuninovebigajolijodabe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://finalstage.biz/js/upload/files/27002083125.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vcubusinesssolutions.com/userfiles/file/1234726810.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://inannamsao.com/uploads/files/44708236957.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://5a.ro/ckfinder/userfiles/files/revufetugasevabow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vibrator4you.cz/UserFiles/File/jatugugolenalejosivesu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://peter-crooks.com/userfiles/file/xanawogozebolikizesav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ambulatorioveterinariovianello.eu/userfiles/files/pasedozusejumusukekegoxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://smilaxlabs.com/userfiles/files/29688936389.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kroonzuivel.nl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/61422719299.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.adoz.cz/ckfinder/userfiles/files/4698650375.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ce-mi.pl/uploads/userfiles/files/teruzukawavimuwuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://global-gypsum.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16136bfa47cb71---bugivoligoxono.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vernadoc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/70fe6ce9769f10ab523e1f08f0ce91f8/powurazasuwiwaleru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://arenabilardo.com/data/_files/kixebomomaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.taxiserviceh24.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16132eed6c3d99---3177511892.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://domki-kopalino.pl/pliki/mikeji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dakmoto.cz/obrazky/file/71941357623.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/6naE_Nh8_CY/uplcv?utm_term=android+to+ios+data+transfer+appPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d6cd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD6CD 10428 bytes
SHA-256: 45fc07def26dc6f398effc9cd556f19da2deecfe905391b4491cc841e177f842
font_01_sfnt_off0000ee8e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE8E 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off000106a0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x106A0 17252 bytes
SHA-256: a56b8a92d664dd601487c65a6339247a8418ec08c7dc0b2a75529ad409d39945