Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 08c9b421e160346d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.9 KB Created: 2021-09-18 18:58:05 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 563bc9fa28fdbb4ecb838f209c7592f1 SHA-1: 67fa390d141f7770cd3c5048ca6c948c6c9bd9b9 SHA-256: 08c9b421e160346d318a459d7d261be60c940390311568ff4e0bcb756c655560
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous links pointing to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting, indicative of a link farm designed to distribute malware. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were directly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs suggest it's designed to trick users into downloading a secondary payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9977

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://chezgregoire.fr/userfiles/80312015944.pdf
    • http://chinawin-consult.com/userfiles/potiwijunu.pdf
    • https://divetechmarine.com/contents/files/sufut.pdf
    • http://assushop.com/userfiles/assushop.com/file/57774917188.pdf
    • http://pekbdt.com/filespath/files/20210908101828.pdf
    • http://vinhhangvien.com/upload/files/90955105389.pdf
    • http://exito-opakowania.pl/userfiles/file/fugeluvogiwano.pdf
    • https://linhquan-group.com/upload/ck/files/73963702025.pdf
    • http://obchodsezlatem.cz/upload/files/vosuwukigi.pdf
    • http://tungalag.mn/userfiles/files/vojasoxinisiwipexekugek.pdf
    • https://www.taxiserviceh24.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613102aa1c43b---96395640535.pdf
    • http://www.kissdocs.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16142f664f10fb---magudoguma.pdf
    • http://airzo.net/userData/board/file/xojoregevoj.pdf
    • http://stefanourso.com/public/userfiles/file/98515150462.pdf
    • http://tauben-buchmeier.de/kleinberliner-schuetzen/userfiles/files/soziv.pdf
    • http://scvumaichiramen.com/uploads/files/xavigotakojojevatal.pdf
    • https://www.grandiosa.is/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/n3n14jm1cttmo1e5v005sft576/rakuralusepojana.pdf
    • https://stpetejazz.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/apmsi8b8n1t0lrjgmm1855pnfr/54620947445.pdf
    • https://cissud.it/uploads/ck_editor/files/xinusamabaj.pdf
    • http://liceoadultos.juniorcollege.cl/userfiles/files/zelofivajarido.pdf
    • http://unicorn-furnitures.com/d/files/59066611738.pdf
    • http://balone.net/_upload/file///81596222063.pdf
    • http://hmconcretemixingplant.ru/d/files/50910652791.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/FevRqgeaUVY/uplcv?utm_term=deezloader+reborn+apk
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dad0.bin
3e01e0efdbcf40af95432ca84bc4b7e20e2c4ca9588e308b3f66bee213cc813f
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDAD0 16896 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000106ed.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x106ED 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00011f04.bin
b215767bf3d78f478b9854dd22cbba72b5b010d43f31c8f76ee1d13960605bd0
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11F04 10320 bytes