Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 18

• Adobe Reader U3D auto-activated 3D annotation — CVE-2009-3459 critical CVE likely CVE_2009_3459_U3D_AUTOACTIVATE
  PDF contains a /Subtype /3D annotation that is configured to auto-activate on page view (/3DA <</A /PV /AIS /I>>) alongside a /U3D stream and JavaScript. This is the document shape used by CVE-2009-3459 (Adobe Reader U3D CLODProgressiveMeshDeclaration heap overflow, APSB09-15): the U3D parser runs without any user interaction once the page is rendered, while the accompanying JavaScript prepares a heap-spray to land controlled memory inside the corrupted allocation.
• Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
  PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
• Adobe Reader U3D CLODProgressiveMeshDeclaration exploit critical CVE likely CVE_2009_3953
  PDF combines malformed U3D 3D content with JavaScript/action activation. CVE-2009-3953 is an Adobe Reader/Acrobat U3D CLODProgressiveMeshDeclaration array-boundary vulnerability triggered by malformed U3D data in a PDF.
• U3D/3D content in PDF — Adobe Reader 3D parser CVE-family indicator high CVE related PDF_U3D_CVE_RELATED
  PDF contains U3D (Universal 3D) or 3D annotation content — CVE-2011-2462 and CVE-2009-3953 are critical vulnerabilities in Adobe Reader's U3D processing that allow arbitrary code execution. U3D content in PDFs is extremely rare in normal documents.
• Adobe Reader APSB09-15 patch-range version gate (CVE-2009-3459) high CVE likely PDF_JS_ADOBE_APSB09_15_PATCH_GATE
  PDF JavaScript gates the exploit payload on an Adobe Reader version range that exactly matches the APSB09-15 patch boundary (< 9.2, < 8.1.7, < 7.1.4). That boundary fingerprints the CVE-2009-2990 / CVE-2009-3459 U3D parser vulnerabilities — no benign script tests all three Reader version-points together.
• Adobe Reader APSB08-13 patch-range version gate (CVE-2007-5659) high CVE likely PDF_JS_ADOBE_APSB08_13_PATCH_GATE
  PDF JavaScript gates the exploit payload on (>= 8 && < 8.1.1) OR (< 7.1) — the Reader 7.0.x / 8.0–8.1.1 window patched by Adobe APSB08-13 for the CVE-2007-5659 Collab.collectEmailInfo buffer overflow. Only kits that target that exact bug check both of those patch points; benign scripts do not.
• PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
  PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
• Annotation subject percent-decoding eval stager critical PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_MARKER_EVAL_STAGER
  OpenAction JavaScript forces annotation enumeration, reads an annotation /Subject payload with getAnnots(), rewrites marker bytes into percent escapes, decodes it with unescape(), and dispatches it through eval. This is a high-confidence exploit-kit staging pattern. It is intentionally not mapped to CVE-2009-1492 unless getAnnots() itself carries the crafted integer or long argument shape for that vulnerability.
• ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35912 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35912
• eval() call high PDF_EVAL
  eval() found — commonly used for obfuscated exploit execution (matched inside decoded stream)
• unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE
  unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
• Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER
  PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
• PDF JavaScript shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
  Decoded PDF JavaScript shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
• JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
  PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN
  PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
• Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://ghjihkvuno.com/nte/trest3/eH1e662482V0100f060006R00000000102T552d17b0201l0409K765d2e22

  • https://www.verisign.com/repository/RPA0
  • https://www.verisign.com/repository/CPS
  • https://www.verisign.com
  • https://www.verisign.com/repository/verisignlogo.gif0
  • https://www.verisign.com/CPS
  • http://www.microsoft.com/truetype/0
  • https://www.verisign.com/rpa
  • http://ocsp.verisign.com/ocsp/status0
  • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA.crl0
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography
  • https://www.verisign.com/CPS0b
  • http://www.iec.ch
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  • https://www.verisign.com/repository/CPS��
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