Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 08a63101ab3c075a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

467.1 KB Created: 2019-01-20 14:19:00 First seen: 2019-04-17
MD5: e5b1a90eb404fcd5ba01cf3d5542652a SHA-1: d7854d98efc29df9d229855975e8b825a6870dd3 SHA-256: 08a63101ab3c075a9e2051820cfabc158ac6e1e131546523f7f437128060dec8
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploitation, specifically targeting CVE-2017-8759 via the Equation Editor. The presence of OLE object data and the ".objupdate" directive strongly suggest that the file is designed to trigger an exploit. This exploit likely leads to the execution of a secondary payload, although the specific mechanism and destination are not detailed in the provided evidence.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00051fbf.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x51FBF 8592 bytes
SHA-256: 67ff0449c56810ed91342d38f4bcc93b13e25946a55d6fed92fc2708e3e82c64
objdata_01_off0005638f.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5638F 18824 bytes
SHA-256: 2f35123f59950497c0fc1d0e4c05124f99dd96e3e5f36769817c36a526c6a740
objdata_02_off000630cb.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x630CB 18758 bytes
SHA-256: 6d1fd4c1189c0bebbb18e612b9c717e0c0529ec426a2a67d649ebbf959e8c3ea