Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0887f239d23f1a70…

MALICIOUS

PDF

51.6 KB Created: 2020-11-02 21:36:16 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 84c480caa62323adda950a84f78313a4 SHA-1: 1da47a82ddada4a7c4f4204161f451c3fa2acbd1 SHA-256: 0887f239d23f1a700845eb21b323ec255b9df19ca274cc34e8e80608952c32b5
94 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure, as indicated by the PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK heuristic. The embedded document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the same URL, suggesting the primary purpose is to drive users to this malicious site. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/aws?keyword=teddy+bridgewater+broken+jaw
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369331/normal_5f926ac4d816b.pdf
    • https://dufevirefat.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438490/7217906.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4380209/normal_5f9f968c58116.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4416493/normal_5f9a054f0e9f8.pdf
    • https://lavigepes.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134437347/600332.pdf
    • https://diziwupufetut.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134477772/6635546.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4371258/normal_5f888da1b6077.pdf
    • https://pasabegimukug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134265340/zisazemovewasogug.pdf
    • https://zalawevovupat.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969727/gesij.pdf
    • https://wupuvogobed.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134507139/2505793.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ad7e20e0-a8d7-4db3-817c-3abfec815986/97742651675.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000089d5.bin
5b88ab41b17e3ae79b4dd79778762acdc283cf411f8ad8a81e0621735d2e55b3
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x89D5 5204 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009bb7.bin
4a91a645ecd1acec861966bf97a5156d91269176922aee552c5870c7ca1e0211
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9BB7 11200 bytes