Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 08848ec68c11d7fe…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.6 KB Created: 2020-12-28 14:10:08 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-15
MD5: 8c919b5388f654656ed61e670437ca51 SHA-1: ec8c5dbd3363dc779155947c9281ce2f56989f8b SHA-256: 08848ec68c11d7fe6f0babdbf9173f6e24f56e724fb5d275e0793c36a4c1c975
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious sites. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were directly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external URLs point towards a malicious redirection scheme.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafftec.ru/123?utm_term=oraci%25C3%25B3n+de+la+ma%25C3%25B1ana+para+dar+gracias+a+dios PDF link annotation
    • https://duvibebo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134375256/6c3d64ce7f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/faresawuf/hfwiihZ/go_fish_mystic.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pudukodup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407572/9f1ac3284bbb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bexusisase.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134596812/4b75e6cdd6d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mudagetani.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134381332/9745917.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://saniwuladekogek.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134759819/kimewiduzumuwe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/saseponirifa/DmgfiiT/zagorexomog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/juxerawabuf/idqgcKE/temakuwox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://raralafelu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134476833/daxepozox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/sisalubitot/UUgs4vq/zutawositefaja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mulevemi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134754511/54bf29.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wurikosaradusif.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384544/lokugu-nezexupakux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nuwebobejope.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407692/jadojuxe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kitakilesa/punowokoziwov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kodipopujufipig/computer_course_certificate_template_word.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e2ef.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE2EF 5476 bytes
SHA-256: 7acae7302b889582b85eda191543e21970656c5fd85fc94c29fa87ca418f3a60
font_01_sfnt_off0000f4df.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF4DF 11008 bytes
SHA-256: a27e7a8a2d15b5fccdb8c77bf74968f725bae6440f68896d539a08ef272411a1
font_02_sfnt_off00011892.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11892 4324 bytes
SHA-256: b50a2106bf82917db0cd3cf88f63c5e8cc3298b343ace5cffc591b35df33d24c

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