Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 087ba9a6a46ac4d8…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

25.0 KB
MD5: 7aae7c2adde097ec5dcc8367af4b0b51 SHA-1: 4dcaf32ff36c9360bc8a3b369d8bc107a93c1097 SHA-256: 087ba9a6a46ac4d815dec1f9360be8660d85812f143552179457e127ba9e49ce
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED` heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this known vulnerability for client execution. The `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristic further suggests that the embedded object is forced to activate, leading to the exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002078.bin
11efe6abb539ccfa0dc4c7f6769276af532a2a3c595da768bf4900a8d15bf4da
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2078 1688 bytes