Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 08768f70a0969166…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

106.5 KB Created: 2020-11-25 12:53:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 2491f08662f5993b01942dcf7297a3ba SHA-1: 6831f0bd550d9b2c2c2390056e299945a6c09092 SHA-256: 08768f70a0969166039f11ee9e673f4ae2149db59a1cec3738aad4daf098d08e
190 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro that automatically executes upon opening the document, indicated by the 'Document_Open' macro and 'OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC' heuristic. The macro utilizes Windows Script Host references and calls to user32.dll functions like PostMessageA and FindWindowExA, suggesting it attempts to interact with the system or download additional content. Several unknown URLs were extracted, likely serving as download locations for secondary payloads.

Heuristics 7

  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://zhonlong.com/Public/ckeditor/plugins/find/dialogs/wyJpQHsIW7DEc.php
    • https://retcon.iworkshop.hu/vendor/laravel-filemanager/images/test-folder/Lht96Am8I8.php
    • https://portal.provisiongroup.com.au/js/soon/56fJTN1EGoy9s2K.php
    • https://buy.manairge.com/img/news/video/yoKHoSxL8p1.php
    • http://evahollmann.de.phees.de/test/content/40.Galerien/05.im-reich-des-fauns/LvQH4dpq1.php
    • http://dev.dyfedsuperfast.co.uk/wp-content/HQVo9WBUrDK.php
    • https://sms.solasystems.net/sms/img/website/fancybox_img/56Zf7fUC04Y7.php
    • http://mail.interactio.ch/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/NwTMPECUxRhF.php
    • https://sistema.eseicanea.com.ar/usr/share/nginx/www/6wGMMgNVH.php
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
400a051f70e1bdfeccd8e4e2d02176dc1a3efc8687652544259efbb47f10bbe0
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 34419 bytes