Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 08627449276d078f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.3 KB Created: 2020-07-09 14:28:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-24
MD5: da445dc70f05bc9e0e1a6a47206ceda7 SHA-1: 1336f241e531c2f71a41edbf07b5ae1b476ecbfc SHA-256: 08627449276d078fe1bdfc3e9c021ee90dca9e97a8c644ebbe37d2d710dc8e09
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, with one pointing to a known malicious redirector. The ML classifier also flagged this PDF as malicious. The document body text is heavily obfuscated and contains a URL that appears to be part of a link farm, suggesting a potential SEO poisoning or content hosting scheme.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wb?keyword=much%20many%20esl%20worksheet In PDF document text
    • http://files.sd50dfl.net/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453198/8265784.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.thegirlsfromguantanamo.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681938/2217839fd6588e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.flyzephyr.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398591/tadupiletokeg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.vexsens.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775846/waforumuwanaxogudo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.u-drain.ca/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739383/7b1840d95c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.westfielddentalpa.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775942/bavef_kezujuwusuk_javexolizepun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.krabidream.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681566/3285554.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.sfmwgc.org/uploads/1/3/0/9/130970016/ninavumadipa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://gopisasiru.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/16212047353.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://duxugol.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/riverefunikosilogirow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tefizewu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/vorodafo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jutufunenuk.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/wuwez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mobulozasa.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/vukojipafejekutu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nugejelibu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/fuxog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wozokaju.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/pitomumatipi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/vewurobafug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/tuwaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/bafewemuwidizisaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/20011772627.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007023.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7023 5136 bytes
SHA-256: a052c1289c90e930b35a4c941be4c8a3f7c6e50e5380d5dfa2adf14a3f1fb2fd
font_01_sfnt_off00008188.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8188 10200 bytes
SHA-256: 353d3e6ea79328112e59793d94897ead44567e80f3c5df3bdfa20e4d04d233d1

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