Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 085418d72779e3cd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

55.6 KB Created: 2020-08-31 14:23:28 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: a563f995cfe2af4567ee3e4d4650eced SHA-1: e83c664003059c243fe79f08eefca4da53126738 SHA-256: 085418d72779e3cd0d03fd28a190c80cbcdcfce0eb0e0fd15f950074f24351ec
154 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF document contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to a redirector service known for malicious activity. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the presence of a link farm suggests an attempt to drive traffic to potentially harmful sites. No scripts were extracted, but the document's structure and embedded URLs are indicative of a phishing or redirection campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wix?keyword=keep+the+aspidistra+flying+george+orwell+pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5057/3724/files/rusovezofabidadodixi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/4525/6352/files/70752816491.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/6006/0567/files/20397917605.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/6678/5949/files/pivetugidigatam.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8012/2532/files/barcelona_uniform_2018-_19.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_f6f038eb6dce4d23bb1f7da16ae09421.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/97493d_8ceb97c418e44c28abaa7bad195e91db.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/ac72e0_443ea644355146b2b71c0d2d8df4321a.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_40b0e2f330ed48b687c04fd0fa65e47c.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/dc8a8e_43ff297b199a4e7faa7efee4a44bdf14.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_196c6694c5074fdab78e83b1d9110e4f.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_2947135ea2b241ec82552138cf8ab89a.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_3716386159e84bb3a521068b19b856cb.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/a107db_fbdd1f417b104c06957bb74002a05ac2.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/735424_3cd5f1dfd30c46c79a5ed4edf5870e39.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/97493d_a8ebba2f5f96479b9e7dd99e2f9868d0.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_820a5227004c441c8dc8a2499c615489.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00009b7d.bin
e05fcd0bf8ea1ebe591ec5eeabc0b662bada9b694400bafc7a354c4c84d1d46d		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9B7D 5464 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000ae2f.bin
ad3d5ad9246f38627abbca836f96e30b3648588a15ce48b3273119d56c1277e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xAE2F 10356 bytes

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