Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 08432dd6e3aa5af6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSM

59.9 KB Created: 2020-02-01 18:28:07 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 12.0000
MD5: 97d997d1cf6f3e3a6c74cf547f69a17e SHA-1: eebc8cd6c4b428266560325f17f032fda1eaf2df SHA-256: 08432dd6e3aa5af68fa4ae67a9eb9e3bfaab70a46a12a8bb688ec0fe387b88fc
460 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_NATIVE_CMD indicates exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of an Auto_Open macro and GetObject call, along with VBA p-code execution, suggests the macro is designed to trigger this exploit. The macro likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload, as indicated by the 'cmD /c ReN %Tmp%\x x& WSCRIpT %tmp%\x..wsf' command fragment.

Heuristics 11

  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor command stager critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_NATIVE_CMD
    Embedded Equation Editor OLE data contains an invalid Equation Native/MTEF stream with an embedded command stager. This is likely CVE-2017-11882 exploitation because the vulnerable Equation Editor component is reached and the malformed native stream directly carries process-launch bytes.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject3.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Embedded Office object carries macros critical OFFICE_EMBEDDED_MACRO_OBJECT
    This document embeds a second Office file that itself contains a VBA macro project or an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet. Hiding a macro-bearing workbook or document inside another document — frequently under an obfuscated, non-standard part name — is a macro-smuggling technique that defeats scanners which only inspect the outer document's macro storage. No benign authoring workflow stages a hidden macro project this way.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Dropper.Valyria-10030821-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Dropper.Valyria-10030821-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Auto_Open macro high OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 9

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
bcd699514b628617456f995b71c6c764e57383ba47a9582f89297f5974984183
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 87111 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
eef0373386c66f690336206a61cc10191618db27ab2add876878a81a97406723
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/embeddings/oleObject2.bin 69632 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
d7cd7081560be093c43b1307d8bec71e83795868af1986737e182d7ac1890eb8
ole-package OOXML xl/embeddings/oleObject2.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 66186 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_01.bin
5e05c702f6e30e90cd22838ef682889022a0806d6de0f6fe39d3a0c5b0f6917f
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 4608 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 shell/COM execution token(s).
ooxml_oleobject_01_ole10native_00.bin
5b67c5f82bd1543c58c4859e56395d26b66db45193a726d4fbdbac317b0807de
ole-package OOXML xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 1974 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 shell/COM execution token(s).
ooxml_oleobject_02.bin
fc8478551fd40f697538932780aac73d7353b60824746c785700941fdacc3255
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/embeddings/oleObject3.bin 5936 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_03.bin
04b1994aef63f72d835dddfa936c6b38016c2d7e27584cafc65b0db9c5940896
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/vbaProject.bin 121856 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Xls.Dropper.Valyria-10030821-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
emf_00.emf
979dde2aed02f077c16ae53546c6df9eed40e8386d6db6fc36aee9f966d2cb82
ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: xl/media/image1.emf 4968 bytes
emf_01.emf
4d4d1e7b04c99dcb8e885915068ad6f74cc2333e91580cdae5ccaa00c427247f
ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: xl/media/image2.emf 1536 bytes