Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0826832dd2b6d96d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.3 KB
MD5: 518568b5c3bfcaa67474cd0b448c1dde SHA-1: a72ca8d71e7a4424e6c54567bf74765ea92dbf4a SHA-256: 0826832dd2b6d96d111d92f8917d86f7acd41abcfed19d9cea448b04b6b0dbeb
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability related to Equation Editor. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code upon opening the document, likely as part of a spearphishing attack.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000e0.bin
d8c8f6e139429f3948b2ee42d20c0a7d6768660eb1a5c4706f815eb6149fd7b9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE0 1896 bytes