Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 08264bd1ffd62522…

MALICIOUS

PDF

68.1 KB Created: 2020-11-16 23:43:23 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-04
MD5: c7c94338e6588ac53563c60172e257e6 SHA-1: 1670a021ac97c4caf6a725bfd89f2983628492db SHA-256: 08264bd1ffd625221b1ee034ec68cc08d81c8ca6e9532db4d7a9438b998a23d5
166 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF document was flagged as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier. It uses a LOLBin command-execution lure. The file embeds a large number of external links characteristic of an SEO link farm. Specific URLs and indicators for this sample are listed in the indicators section.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafffe.ru/123?utm_term=jacksonville+north+pulaski+school+district+pay+scale PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366017/normal_5f86f553ac920.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366034/normal_5f95b15e7d028.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4386333/normal_5f92a34ebbae0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rovalexi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134598456/4309e8e68b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4426267/normal_5f9af01cdc8a1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fabedajigunud.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134480588/5fd2bdb61b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sakukavazu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379729/4118662.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://risenezapaf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134481661/bukavanarigigin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rofexelugikovu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134732340/tilonozodirekujipe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bizumoku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681494/gewidaguw-logugu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4370269/normal_5f9d55f8caa50.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fabedajigunud.weebly.com/upIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zirojopemup/gonevaju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/teximikamukubo/windows_cmd_check_partitions.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cd05.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCD05 5376 bytes
SHA-256: 91abfd0852743ba0e95d24648b2876ce0e8cd5f94787a702daf0e749284c1334
font_01_sfnt_off0000df55.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDF55 10444 bytes
SHA-256: d359ddc8a6b843f666641ea87e7f7861dd57612139216950fc5e2b42fe3574c3