PDF malware analysis — malicious · 07f7da38c061f99f

MALICIOUS

PDF

60.4 KB Created: 2020-10-28 08:05:49 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-26

MD5: 1e8e7424860d7419ff677b99ea2b99f8 SHA-1: 438dabdf50f0a3e7ea62ebbcf28ae87ad5e2325e SHA-256: 07f7da38c061f99f00bcc1da5fed93903dfc32f1758d010b2004016455d9e14b

184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable hosting, and one critical link to a known malicious redirector. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. This suggests the document's primary purpose is to redirect users to malicious infrastructure, likely for phishing or to download further payloads.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK

PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM

Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM

Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL https://ttraff.com/123?keyword=overview+work+and+energy+concept+map+answers In PDF document text
- https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379971/normal_5f95a823daec4.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4383923/normal_5f98ea5f5dc10.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4384480/normal_5f970bd081cfe.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://zenovoruzunej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134339910/tosoxigedidak-tuniwofedire-tajalakobup.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://riragojefo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857115/wejadafi-lanefemo-fejumilaxopevon.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://kolivobaka.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134500933/8520657.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://gejatovuri.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406669/rupogisevonaj.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://liwevapazu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131071299/5407494.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://jawowigo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130774982/kariwogagalan.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://pirivelel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134505874/kenusoz-fowojuxotajuj.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://beperiguvo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134320750/977fbb3a66ce38.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://xavoxoxuda.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379246/sevexutipisu_xudagarupewil_puxegapakizo_lonom.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://sijevunima.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131859613/kemodufedafuxedif.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/nitajosasa/different_types_of_pulses_with_names_and_images.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8215fc03-6175-426f-ae61-803358566406/fopafukupewezefuzonoroli.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d99a5958-83eb-4d85-9429-dba044642b94/23352114187.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ed18eb5c-4b61-47fc-987d-efb0476cdbf6/xujamawiwatojesuraxa.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/wilugugo/78656408125.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/kevava/annuities_explained.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/xurixado/los_compas_y_el_diamantito_legendario_descarga_gratis.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
- http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`font_00_sfnt_off0000acfb.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xACFB	5708 bytes
SHA-256: `cf4cfcbd31afa0fd7320782e46383094d6944b2e7a8fb0119675a35c8ca07afb`
`font_01_sfnt_off0000c070.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC070	10376 bytes
SHA-256: `d95f8be4c065d73d3be3c3121a91a619d87a3876c4fefb0cdd5d843c5532665e`

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.