Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 07f4f5eddb390110…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.9 KB Created: 2020-08-12 04:45:37 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: b6180ca004f6072199c9bb1004cb3314 SHA-1: 6316df2f060b7207fc4983bd6f8d7249de71c76b SHA-256: 07f4f5eddb3901107fc951206e2a70c3a28b979092563a6ca86a94ac3e350d86
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous links, many pointing to a link farm hosted on Shopify, and one critical link to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text referencing "Adobe pdf maker download" and a URL that matches the malicious redirector. This suggests a phishing or social engineering attack aiming to direct users to malicious infrastructure, potentially for malware delivery or further phishing.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=adobe+pdf+maker+download
    • http://files.rabunlakestrading.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775518/9a5e25f9.pdf
    • http://files.pjuncaged.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070442/937b3fe7df3b.pdf
    • http://files.crissysimon23.info/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384568/ledoxovito.pdf
    • http://files.mtwcare.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814874/xunobe.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/4026/8711/files/5943577247.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0441/0625/2440/files/juzofuxezamadi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/6275/4461/files/oramento_na_administrao_de_empresas_sanvicente.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5592/2852/files/xexabito.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/40369191557.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/4920/6439/files/tijox.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/0255/8621/files/xezenigazuxupesefu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/0514/1411/files/56796147076.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0451/3621/6229/files/adobe_writer_download_for_windows_10.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/3111/7467/files/dugufid.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7764/8027/files/wuxadosefowilip.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0447/7334/3383/files/cotton_pink_bollworm.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b657.bin
29c08fdf13c112e1de0d69ee4c38af8dd30847c10b62ca49b1abae919791cfc7		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB657 5236 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000c8c2.bin
2f6d6690a0c9290dc94873a363dc2bdb93de4a86decca8965e0564f6510037aa		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC8C2 5296 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000dabe.bin
c98df4d294567bcb16acb1b8b4cdf6efa1b07526e378b13180a8bfff7c0c65c2		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDABE 10456 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off0000fec7.bin
d97693af3883ef4b8ab9c4f94a2f62802c6df3627ecc5ab5b0ef46b22874265a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFEC7 16488 bytes

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