Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 07e1a88ac0340b8a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

17.5 KB
MD5: 45320cd03dce897264a5055916f906fc SHA-1: e7d06da0d29a2e38605e6fe469efc0b06c50a992 SHA-256: 07e1a88ac0340b8a109a278af4b927be069c19d0e563ac05583a6c817ef877bf
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics for the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates an attempt to exploit CVE-2017-11882 for code execution. The presence of \objupdate further suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, likely to download and execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000008e9.bin
5d55435655cd78ecfa5e58516f891a70903d6c2a764095bd9493cc119b7a74d4
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x8E9 1933 bytes