Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 07beadeffaa17076…

MALICIOUS

PDF

33.5 KB Created: 2020-11-01 04:56:57 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: cfdb86e17e3dadac8c1d44368c79338e SHA-1: e196dfef4bd1c90a69d167e5424d12815afc439a SHA-256: 07beadeffaa1707676a0a421906bb41cad2ee28f55a4542bc3f04944f4f71b21
184 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, functioning as a link farm. One of the primary links, 'https://ttraff.club/pify?keyword=what+is+isoelectronic+with+mg2%252B', is identified as a known malicious redirector. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness, supporting the assessment of a malicious link distribution attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.club/pify?keyword=what+is+isoelectronic+with+mg2%252B In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4384323/normal_5f9aebe9d72e7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://povilaromegew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134486615/8136285.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wesodopudo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134234684/guzidiwezixasigiza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://korumarivaz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134506991/6fde7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sudateneturoxa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134322726/majikikarajojamov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lajojixuvoporor.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738555/9600194.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tumixivig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636813/59847.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xalipifizipig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379045/totenowawuni.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wilujogid.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134347442/2866677.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rajerese.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134387708/dubavikapuvunon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bubixoduxufito.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070588/rexabalot_memavad_wosebudorujoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zesopupejilit.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738861/wigusil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/6662/9032/files/21933315552.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0502/4979/3698/files/limiting_reactant_problems_and_answers_gcse.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000044ed.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x44ED 5452 bytes
SHA-256: 8d4b8531ae19dbe2d7e406b036acd1e37b93584e7508495bf997ababe0a2827e
font_01_sfnt_off00005764.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5764 10064 bytes
SHA-256: 9e0ff171412a34ec04856104a87a43a84e9ef0b4341a999cfa3dac3b80d1b3ab

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