RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 079a209c87986fe7

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

736.9 KB

MD5: 9b738622dcb8d70bb4a066f267d58e75 SHA-1: e5787c0c8dbcbe1a7453477b369408f6ba26d631 SHA-256: 079a209c87986fe770e0d3cb8ad99d17f04dd8baf8b9a296dc023cf3352c7624

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that exploits the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code, typically leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload. The presence of the Equation Editor ProgID and the decoded OLE object strongly indicate this exploit.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000043.bin` `f5e0dca4dd9ca5fecc2f5f4403d5d0a06f1665103a2767c6b2aef07a3e6ec982`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x43	377202 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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