Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0781d057d647d670…

MALICIOUS

PDF

87.8 KB Created: 2021-07-23 23:31:42 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: e7c6c84b1c804b198421aab9dfe7694f SHA-1: 4e3a609588c3419fd5cf77ede5d0c5d070d8aa76 SHA-256: 0781d057d647d670795cc75c5b0754630488f4db8b12d109718ff54e47fe145b
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1553.005 Security Software Installation

This PDF document exhibits malicious characteristics, including a high ML classifier score and ClamAV detection as a phishing trojan. It contains a link farm pointing to compromised WordPress uploads and disposable hosting, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The document also includes instructions to disable security software and install a browser extension, which are common social engineering tactics to bypass defenses and facilitate further compromise.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9986

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Security software disable instruction high SE_SECURITY_BYPASS
    Document instructs the user to disable antivirus or security software — unusual for ordinary documents and high-risk in an unsolicited file
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://etonbio.com/newsLetters/images/file/35207595767.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://bharatdarshan.net/rgroup/ckfinder/userfiles/files/fokekekidupe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vestmorecapital.com/images/epost/fowufo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.opencalgary.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160920743a0965---febim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lideparts.com/userfiles/file/1623617519.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://renault-service.com/userfiles/86374749641.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://questyme.ca/userfiles/file/52587259183.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://serting.eu/userfiles/files/72401570307.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://syuncyoku.jp/upload/file/92643782104.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sunarsurdurulebilir.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ohobeks55385sr0fjfpa931rf5/wosakofapa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://qualitycountscleaning.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4f061e31a6a96d5558b87c2ff5b7c295/68998190649.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alnadaoil.com/userfiles/file/36218039489.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kleiberit.ru/files/file/34482666602.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://weeb.nu/userfiles/file/81660073699.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://verkoop-je-wagen.be/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606dea657667d---77951344668.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://chagatea.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/afec69190fad446d8c76355024fd5eec/zupamixirufadetowevux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://eccdc.org/application/webroot/userfiles/file/fonaronafira.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.barankayalar.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c341a376f7f---jigorilazufasavaked.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.thediethub.in/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16094cd7679303---7634670511.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://duquenne-moteurs.fr/webroot/upload/files/55783105886.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://g-ortho.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a3559235fcd---84432807656.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mttrasportisrl.it/dati/upload/file/49689432660.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.bandungmesin.com/file/81897121217.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.theagentpipeline.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ac85cd5855f---nekoxogexeva.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/BvfzZFkJO3s/uplcv?utm_term=does+bellsouth+net+email+still+workPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f1a8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF1A8 17536 bytes
SHA-256: 1743eaadd337037ecf71e1883bb68330e561bf088d0dbcf64845e802aee7e8de
font_01_sfnt_off00011fef.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11FEF 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00013806.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13806 10792 bytes
SHA-256: 936cf0a50cd8174648164d87849c4571de499d6760ed7eebd53d081c89d34dba