Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 078023d375daed4c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.21 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-01-30
MD5: a1333cf1f72034cb2556139964725339 SHA-1: 43a9ef1473b29f19f3cbd2f5c4b2350c646f26b3 SHA-256: 078023d375daed4c5cd65c8518fad6a7780ff8d8750c2008c33e4118850ba894
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-11882 indicates that the sample exploits a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor OLE object. This vulnerability is commonly used to deliver secondary payloads. No VBA macros were found to be executable, and the document body is minimal, suggesting the primary attack vector is the embedded Equation Editor exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
f81b5dc0f134bff67b32850863689811e3ff1dad6ed5cd918403c20cc4d6ab1e		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0074F363/Ole10Native 30803 bytes
ole10native_02.bin
e26127a70613ec58c91bc5ae921fb6861dea0e147b1a171f0fe9e0247f5a5cee		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0074F36A/OLe10nATIve 1764 bytes

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