Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0767366e67e68ecf…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.7 KB Created: 2021-09-01 07:20:50 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: af39a36e0abf826e5a7cb81dad70975d SHA-1: d7defbadd4f48cd4ec431c5d4555f403acb8f968 SHA-256: 0767366e67e68ecf2e95682fc05f9ca4bcfd837e4d9ce3b5ad56ccc086561d03
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs pointing to compromised WordPress sites and other disposable hosting, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and URL patterns are consistent with malicious document lures.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9978

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://krisoc.ru/uplcv?utm_term=124+country+code PDF link annotation
    • http://rogo-rotterdam.nl/files/dezaritorinexukileberu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cspdental.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ceda365d3fe7d02e4457532500982291/99998278730.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hongshengfish.com/uploadfiles/20210515/210515133510858423942i535g2rmp.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.alignerco.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8ae088395dec0c1a7dae78208137016f/37510898416.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://altinhediyeler.com/calisma2/files/uploads/kirofef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://amesmedicalservices.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161216e29921d3---tutepeximitok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xn--80aaa1arbfjoe3bzh.xn--p1ai/data/files/juwanuvu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://braintradingbcn.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/830766ddb5756c4d4049beddaf22e5c2/kadenepujulalajonixu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://eingangrad.ch/userfiles/files/7002035827.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jager-ig.tw/up_photo/file/73054780272.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gingerwooddesign.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16075760a171f2---29623614428.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.autopsrus.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/sixakekowo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fratellifurloni.it/file/bazobo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jensbrode.de/files/file/vazefagiroweki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.airportlimofortlauderdale.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ff81f6e85ed---lirizuzomorikelujiwu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://shopabrang.com/images/files/gezovuzobopurabab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.hs-hofgastein.salzburg.at/ckfinder/userfiles/files/korod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ohcsi.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/23766152863.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://anpheatingandac.com/nbloom/fckuploads/file/raweluxijutafifogumub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://thesaddlebank.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/h3dr69caf7pen4evbffhn2t025/zimesek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://labsshop.com/d/files/31052003628.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://macphersonproperties.com/clients/876251/File/rupadodugukamobonewekuzek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://3gr-group-com.gbintl.com/ci/userfiles/files/tisapun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ascensionchina.com/userfiles/file/87801021332.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://resicolor.com/upload/files/50399964529.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e59d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE59D 10264 bytes
SHA-256: f2afa4533a4f2fc56caa891d3b996b54fe7d24903d4e8d847becd277cdedd8b0
font_01_sfnt_off0000fcf3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFCF3 19076 bytes
SHA-256: ebdd565fb8ed790f561d3eebe633e439085547046261990107ab5c237a4784f8
font_02_sfnt_off00012eae.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12EAE 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.