Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 074a27b2ed0d8d22…

MALICIOUS

RTF

98.9 KB First seen: 2024-10-06
MD5: eea7898502a02cd374a71c7f7b8853a9 SHA-1: 926969d2d387f4ae3e61d1817cb592616eba6ba3 SHA-256: 074a27b2ed0d8d2218595d5e078289df5a547f16a05f900e0dda945a7287853c
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates an attempt to force activation of the embedded object, which is likely to trigger the exploit. This exploit is known to download and execute a second-stage payload, hence the high confidence in a malicious attack pattern.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001f75.bin
9619c16fe9633710b90e567beb0b8396eeb9db0902bc6b011b28b205792c7762
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1F75 1934 bytes