Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 07464dbe8979eeae…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

83.8 KB First seen: 2023-09-29
MD5: 8a8289752db8ca75e50788c7ce1b1e80 SHA-1: dee08cb992314605730d2bd0c802ea4917e8eab5 SHA-256: 07464dbe8979eeae7ab51b558312c9add719f420ea076a88f77903860deeeabf
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object and specifically targets the Equation Editor, a known vector for exploits like CVE-2017-11882. The presence of the \objupdate directive indicates an attempt to automatically activate the embedded object upon opening. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass macro security settings and trigger the exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000620d.bin
66f4821f6f2cd3162859299d8ef1b2236b305985fbe9f6d9a63c34b05492575b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x620D 1449 bytes