Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0745ec389f93d672…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

156.2 KB Created: 2021-01-04 18:59:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 8383cdf19264eba1548e3f3e63779673 SHA-1: 4e62809c7d2d2b6591eca87eefe754638bfef72a SHA-256: 0745ec389f93d672009867300d2cbab8ed00bad2db9496fab3f62a649e156943
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains VBA macros, including a Document_Open auto-execution macro. This macro utilizes obfuscated calls to CreateObject to instantiate the Scripting.FileSystemObject, which is then used to create and write to files with suspicious names and paths like 'X:\ZfjaGxEE\FKCRoAp.GoRlEtL'. This behavior suggests the macro is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
28e0aab9def1820176582f12126397a14f2c858209766b704c735ce1d1db4cc2
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 7154 bytes