Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 072ddb15a816c4b1…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

361.8 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 12.0000
MD5: 1f488409a04849440a54a3a274d914bc SHA-1: cb8b8b0cb08cfb38784dd30c688f4fe669a5b483 SHA-256: 072ddb15a816c4b1c576badd3159ab35e1802128a57017bc2147e36a3356c87d
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor. Heuristics indicate a high likelihood of exploitation for CVE-2018-0798, which allows for arbitrary code execution. No document body or scripts were extracted, but the presence of the vulnerable Equation Editor object is sufficient evidence for this assessment.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Embedded Equation Editor OLE data contains anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style Equation Editor exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like, but it does not match the exact public matrix-overflow byte signature.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Hidden worksheet (hidden) low OOXML_HIDDEN_SHEET
    Excel workbook contains 1 hidden sheet(s) — hidden sheets are commonly used to conceal macro code, staging data, or intermediate payload construction
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
0dd50929ad8b88f8d66a221aa3f70a4673e431cd694ad52708bce10955237b16		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 4096 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
fe07f81f21804d91c71c05499a795de6981d195597be3d583ee87c7e08df7af1		 ole-package OOXML xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10NaTIvE 1539 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_01.bin
a13a5483f9bbc6735e7e1361eafe5b8bce8ebbcf344020b3494999f56c49ecb9		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/embeddings/Microsoft_Office_Word_Macro-Enabled_Document1.docm 28323 bytes
emf_00.emf
83a2e6b916872c02d92d5b6abfde603948828bd1364939fdaa1db0c5d52b31f0		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: xl/media/image8.emf 498420 bytes

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