Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 072d452d181adbca…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

61.3 KB
MD5: 3585873ff559b339ce1ed181cf2c26c0 SHA-1: 1189fc8c7e1fc8db4d89bbea5b72f7464c499119 SHA-256: 072d452d181adbca486c143de3c41500bdccd335ec909af452360babdd040b92
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that triggers an Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive forces activation of this object, leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads, though no specific payload or C2 infrastructure was directly observed in this static analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002112.bin
01798559b2c6cc00fc0bf320105763bdb98d45bcbba66e03c160b3183025e737
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2112 1890 bytes