Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 072abcd3de210f17…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.9 KB
MD5: 93ea97de046136907db585260184d07f SHA-1: 775502d21b534b3c8cfe1e2f726df54b372be521 SHA-256: 072abcd3de210f17fbe2b4edbfd8b9f7e34bf6f10e79a53a851fd0b4e9adfb08
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates the file is designed to exploit a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening. The presence of ".objupdate" further suggests an attempt to force OLE object activation, likely to trigger the exploit.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000090.bin
c6727cdc21da7b76833c9e406bcac65cea542299474e131587ef4325919e1118
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x90 1742 bytes