Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0729cad6f2654805…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.7 KB Created: 2021-05-25 15:29:31 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-23
MD5: 747120b0e2a91cec6d1a8065d7e1d7b2 SHA-1: f34de8c1e90d69a680367a90f7a09b02fcded4ae SHA-256: 0729cad6f2654805a857b40b35f3143cb915205c70b87b51c142e0ae78055a18
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or phishing operation. The 'DOC BODY' content, though heavily obfuscated, contains text related to printer configuration, which is likely a lure. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution via these links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9954

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://xajibur.ru/strik?utm_term=configurar+impresora+epson+l375+wifi+sin+cd PDF link annotation
    • https://vizodifoberesin.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/9/134900429/4096071.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://febefadu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453100/8565190.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4425533/normal_5fd86fa9b54f4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4390366/normal_5fe4f9de22f13.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zilakakazaxo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134442972/lujono.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4418170/normal_5fe3f81f894be.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4471488/normal_5fde11392be3a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fidurelofomus.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740547/9169195.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4455174/normal_6069ca7ad9aed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vajipexinonadol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134096003/bupukasezitom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gavivexov.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134667590/kuzeleragikuxiwetuz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://funiduned.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134773133/rekiw-lapejafer-giliranaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lumovomudin.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134704265/9419346.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://goxuxogegeta.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134688707/rekumivupexujo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4470232/normal_60201a33f1593.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4459058/normal_5ff69ef49fb05.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bifotuvimutojuz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969437/11cec49f13.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ninuxegomozul.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871835/2c8aa1c583105f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mokazeke.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384082/gadowigupiv-jagek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366045/normal_605a1beaa4cfa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mufamemibota.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856380/888909.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bisapovepizaj/jinerivugudekon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/rupatojuko/what_is_a_client_service_associate_at_morgan_stanley.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wulagisi/nokitutupus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gonasidupij/56330239982.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dugibabafod/airbnb_host_guarantee_payment_request_form.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e833.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE833 5760 bytes
SHA-256: b4a166d57e6fe54913e49a120da1e7b37e9514d9a94f14f5263026343e080927
font_01_sfnt_off0000fbcf.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFBCF 11480 bytes
SHA-256: 19ac85adb10f8192452fcdd65b3a20d9bcf1aa73b578b15e04d41fa7f890272e
font_02_sfnt_off00012143.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12143 4324 bytes
SHA-256: d1f4a20f0e35a0564be54678b929bb8c711862c507f070c2b9a6abea8daf4378

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