Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 071f6a846ef55f40…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.1 KB
MD5: b401523afb3e0122d00964c92e1fe2ea SHA-1: 0394f36ac229eef739d7d0750ac89fdc3851bb79 SHA-256: 071f6a846ef55f40bd430507bec2649deaf832ce64d51a092a955a1b0dc236a9
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates an attempt to exploit a client execution vulnerability, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment. No further IOCs were extracted from the static analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a7.bin
e0463e7e2f999b1540c69e0d7f478eaa415ea76f9c1b0ca323396ab41bb2f60e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA7 1349 bytes